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SOETOMO AND TRADE UNIONISM*
Savitri Scherer
In reaction to political oppression by the colonial administration 
during the 1920s and 1930s, some Indonesian nationalist leaders sought 
a middle way between the uncompromising opposition of the Marxist revo­
lutionaries and the collaborationist rationalizations of the native 
adm inistrative o ffic ia ls  employed by the Department of the Interior .
One important leader from the moderate nationalist group was Dr. Soe- 
tomo, Soetomo did not accept colonial repression, but he also recog­
nized the weakness of the n atives* 1 position--a weakness caused by 
economic as well as p olitical underdevelopment. Both Soetomo's analy­
sis of his society and his advice regarding trade unions illustrate  
his views on overcoming this weakness.
Soetomofs Place in the Nationalist Movement
Dr. Soetomo (1888- 1938), 1 who came from a "newly arrived" priyayi  
fa m ily ,2 grew up in the period of the so-called Ethical colonial policy .
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first National Conference 
of The Asian Studies Association of Australia, Melbourne, in May 1976. It has bene­
fited from comments and suggestions from George McT. Kahin, Ruth McVey, and others.
I would also like to thank David Reeves and other members of the Indonesian Study 
Group at Sydney University for a stimulating discussion of an earlier draft.
1For more on Dr. Soetomo's life and views, see Savitri Scherer, "Harmony and 
Dissonance: Early Nationalist Thought in Java" (M.A. thesis, Cornell University,
1975), pp. 183-255. Soetomo's father had been formally trained to teach in govern­
ment schools, but he then embarked on an administrative career, eventually attaining 
the position of wedana (native district head) . At that time it was still an unusual 
achievement for someone who did not come from a bupati (regional head, the highest 
rank within the native administrative system) family to attain the position of wedana. 
Both Soetomo's maternal and paternal grandfathers were wealthy landowners and palang 
(headmen) of their respective villages. However, village heads were below the native 
administrative hierarchy of the colonial government, which ended at the level of 
assistant wedana.
2The term priyayi is used here to denote that class of people eligible for some 
sort of government office. That eligibility could be ascribed by birth, or it could 
be acquired by Westernized education in government-controlled institutions. Initial­
ly, most of those who received such educations were already entitled by birth to hold 
administrative positions. But around the turn of the century an increasing propor­
tion of graduates from professional schools came from families whose members would 
not have been so privileged. The priyayi thus came to include the "old priyayi"-- 
noble families of the principalities of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, and the Javanese 
territorial bureaucracy from the bupati on down, and the "new priyayi"--Javanese pro­
fessionals and white-collar workers, including medical practitioners like Soetomo,
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He was graduated from the Batavia native medical college (STOVIA) in 
1911. In 1908, while s t ill  a student at this college, he was instru­
mental in founding Budi Utomo, an association generally regarded today 
as the earliest nationalist association organized along Western l i n e s .3 *
In the years immediately following his graduation, Soetomo spent most 
of his time practicing m edicine, serving in many remote places in 
Sumatra. In 1919, he went to Holland for further study, and there be­
came chairman of the Indische Vereeniging during the period 1921-22.
The association was then undergoing an ideological transition , and 
soon thereafter it took a radical political stand, demanding immediate 
independence for Indonesia.*4, On his return to Indonesia in 1923, Soe­
tomo was appointed lecturer at the medical college in Surabaya. He 
served for a short time as a representative on the local government 
council, but resigned in disgust at the coun cil’ s ineffectiveness in 
defending the interests of the natives. He was also invited to join  
the Volksraad, but declined.
In 1924, Soetomo founded the Indonesische Studieclub in Surabaya.5 
In 1930, he converted this study club into a p o litica l  party, the
government school teachers, engineers, and lawyers. For more on the relationship 
between "new1’ and ’’old” priyayi, see Scherer, ’’Harmony and Dissonance,” Ch. 1. On 
the priyayi cultural milieu and the role of native officials in the colonial adminis­
tration, see Heather Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja, Java’s Indigenous Administrative 
Corps and Its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule” (Ph.D. thesis, Yale 
University, 1973), Chs. 1-3; and her ’’The Priyayi,” Indonesia, 19 (April 1975), pp. 
57-77.
3For more on the early period of Budi Utomo, see A. Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indo­
nesian nationalism: The Early Years of Budi UtomOj 1908-1918, Institute of Developing 
Economies Occasional Paper No. 10 (Tokyo, 1972). Nagazumi, however, fails to observe 
that the establishment of Budi Utomo in 1908 was significant in terms of intraclass 
friction among the priyayi. The association was formed several years after STOVIA 
was modernized, and it was initiated, and dominated in its initial stages, by gradu­
ates and students of this school. Its formation clearly marked the self-conscious 
’’arrival” of the new professional element in the old priyayi class. The Javanese 
administrative officials attempted to undermine the potential social influence of 
these newcomers by forming their own exclusive association, Sedya Mulya, in the same 
year.
**In 1922, the name Indische Vereeniging was changed to Indonesische Vereeniging. 
In 1924, it was further changed to Perhimpunan Indonesia, with Iwa Kusumasumantri as 
chairman and Hatta at treasurer. (See Scherer, ’’Harmony and Dissonance,” p. 156 n.
8.) During Soetomo1s chairmanship he was attacked by the younger, more radical mem­
bers for being ’’too moderate and rambling.” In turn, as he wrote in a letter to his 
brother, Soetomo felt that, with the exception of Hatta, these youngsters were a dan­
ger to the future of Indonesia. R. Soetomo, Kenang2an (Surabaya: n .p ., 1934). For 
a participant’s account of the history of the Indische Vereeniging and its develop­
ment into Perhimpunan Indonesia, see R. Sunario, ’’Perhimpunan Indonesia dan peranan- 
nja dalam perdjuangan kemerdekaan kita,” Seminar Sedjarah Dasional I I  (Jogjakarta: 
n .p ., 1970), 5 ,p t . 2. On the later development of Perhimpunan Indonesia, see J. 
Ingleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian nationalist Movement3 1923-1928, 
Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 4 (Clayton, Vic.: Centre of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1975).
5Dr. Soetomo’s Indonesische Studieclub was a revision and an adaptation of an 
association suggested by Dr. Satiman Wirjosandjojo in 1923. Satiman’s earlier plan 
to establish a club solely for young educated priyayi did not materialize for lack
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Partai Bangsa Indonesia (P B I ) , which in 1935 fused with Budi Utomo to 
become Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia P a r ty ) . 
Parindra, representing the moderate cooperative view, was one of the 
two major secular nationalist parties of the 1 9 3 0 s .6 Yet Soetomo him­
self directed most of his energy toward improving the immediate eco­
nomic and social welfare of the native community rather than on party 
p o l i t i c s .7 He in itiated  the establishment of the first  native bank, 
the Bank Nasional Indonesia, and the first  native insurance company, 
Bumi Putra. He was also influential in establishing  the peasant coop­
erative organization , Rukun Tani, and various orphanages, leprosaria , 
and other public health in s t itu t io n s .8 Soetomo clearly played a cru­
cial role in the development of Indonesian nationalism . That role , 
however, lay more in shaping an Indonesian social identity , supported 
by economic prosperity, rather than an Indonesian p o litica l identity 
as such. He was above all concerned with raising  the social and c u l­
tural level of the native community by giving them the resources to 
improve their economic condition.
The Gamelan Analogy
Soetomo wrote in both Javanese and Indonesian. His writings were 
directed prim arily to the native Western-educated e l it e . He tried to 
show his readers ways to improve themselves economically, socially , and 
intellectually , and how to survive under harsh colonial oppression. 
Soetomo did not ignore the idea of indep en den t  In do n esia ," but since 
he himself enjoyed the privileges of high status and did not feel con­
stricted socially  or p ro fe ss io n a lly ,9 he assumed that the concept of 
’’independence, M at least in some personal sense, was a more immediately 
achievable reality . It was this experience of personal independence 
from which Soetomo’ s aspirations for his community grew. It served as 
the basis for his concept of the state of Indonesia Mulia ( ’’Glorious 
Indonesia” ) as the primary goal for Indonesians. Having once achieved
of support. Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (Bandung: 
Van Hoeve, 1960), p. 215. For more on Soetomo’s study club, see ibid., pp. 227-29.
6The other party was Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, Indonesian People’s 
Party), established in 1937, which took a more radical, but still cooperative, stance. 
See George McT. Kahin, nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Uni­
versity Press, 1952), pp. 95-96. In 1939, Parindra had 10,000 members, and Gerindo 
5,000. For comparison, the PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia) had 12,000 mem­
bers. Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Pall 
Mall, 1971), p. 76.
7Van Niel, The Emergence, p. 251.
8It was also on his advice that the Muhammadiyah later expanded its activities 
to building hospitals and clinics. Scherer, ’’Harmony and Dissonance,” p. 187 n. 13.
9In 1917, Soetomo married a Dutch nurse, who worked with him at a missionary 
hospital in Blora, Central Java (Soetomo, Kenang2an, p. 113). Because of his mar­
riage, Soetomo was entitled to become a naturalized Dutch citizen, with rights equal 
to those of a Dutchman. Aware that his wife might be placed in an awkward position 
by marrying a native, someone with far lower status and fewer rights in the eyes of 
the colonial government, Soetomo raised with her the possibility of becoming natural­
ized. Sensitive to her husband’s involvement with his own people’s independence 
movement, she strongly urged him not to change his nationality (ibid., p. 117).
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Indonesia M ulia, Indonesians would again become Men of History, in con­
trol of the destiny of their land and people. For Soetomo, "indepen­
dence" was less a p olitical aim than an inner s t a t e .10
In his ar t ic le , "Koewadjiban lan Gamelan" ("Duty and Gam elan"), 
written in 1932, Soetomo pointed out that it is a man’ s duty (kuwajiban) 
to work for the glory of his coun try .11 The task (pegaweyan) which he 
chooses to take up in order to f u l f i l l  his duty must be carefully 
chosen. A person should choose the one task he performs best, whatever 
it may be. Soetomo used participation  in a gamelan group as a subtle 
metaphor for how a man might choose the type of task he should pursue.
In a gamelan, the person who plays the kendang (drum) should be someone 
proficient at it ; the same principle applies to those who play the 
gambang3 kempul3 kenong3 gong3 and the rest of the instrum ents.12 Each 
person must perform his task in harmony with the other members of the 
orchestra, who in turn are each performing their own tasks as best they 
can. To maintain harmony, Soetomo continued, each person should be 
aware of the regulation and the rhythm of the melody to be played--"He 
should know when to beat the instrument and when to r e s t . " 13 *
To anyone fam iliar with the gamelan orchestra, Soetomo1s concept 
of gamelan-playing and the subtle relation of kuwajiban and pegaweyan 
involved clearly  reflects the thoughts of many Javanese priyayi regard­
ing their roles in the community. Just as a gamelan orchestra must 
have firm guidance, so must Javanese society. But the character of 
this leadership d iffers  from Western ideas of community leadership. 
According to a well-known priyayi m usicologist, Martopangrawit, 1  ^ there 
are two main functional groups in a gamelan orchestra: the pamangku 
(those who support or carry) and the pamurba (those who are in charge 
or su p e rv ise ). These two groups are further subdivided into two. The 
pamangku are composed of the pamangku lagu ( e .g . ,  saron3 gambang, or 
gender) and pamangku irama ( e .g . ,  kenong, kempul or gong). The pamurba 
consist of the pamurba lagu {rehab) and pamurba irama (kendang). No 
instrument or musician is more important than another. Pamurba and
10In his writings Soetomo stressed achieving Indonesia Mulia rather than Indo­
nesia Merdeka (Independent Indonesia). He argued that a country could only attain 
glory when free of bondage to another country. Thus the demand for independence for 
Indonesia should not be the ultimate goal of the nationalist struggle. Rather, by 
working for Indonesia Mulia, nationalists would automatically bring about an inde­
pendent Indonesia.
11"Koewadjiban lan Gamelan," in R. Soetomo, Poespa Rinontje (Surabaya: Soember 
Kemadjoean Rakjat, 1932), pp. 11-12.
12Ibid., p. 11. 13Ibid., p. 12.
1**R. L. Martopangrawit, Pengetahuan Karawitan (Surakarta: Dewan Mahasiswa 
A .S .K .I ., 1972), 1, A, pp. 9-14. Another priyayi musicologist, K. R. T. Madukusumo, 
who is in charge of Jogjakarta court music, sees the gamelan as a reflection of court 
administration, with its distinctive status hierarchy--the big gong representing the 
king; the kendang and rehab, the prime ministers; the smaller gong, the court offi­
cials; the kenong and kempul, the royal servants. Madukusumofs allocation of de­
creasing status to each type of instrument is based on the increasing frequency with 
which these instruments are played. Such status gradations are not, however, recog­
nized by village musicians. See Margaret Kartomi, "Javanese Gamelan Aesthetics--Some 
Preliminary Thoughts" (paper delivered at the- Thirtieth Congress of Human Sciences
in Asia and North Africa, Mexico City, 1976), pp. 9-10.
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pamangku are mutually dependent and tightly  integrated with one another. 
One follows the other in a continuous stream, each taking the lead in 
turn. Each musician knows when to beat his instrument and when to 
stop. (This is especially  true in traditional Javanese gamelan playing , 
where no written music is used .) Adherence to the melodic and rhythmic 
pace set by the pamurba lagu is required of the musicians simply to en­
sure a harmonious r e s u l t .15 In addition , each participant thinks of 
him self, not as a creator, but as a preserver of musical tradition ; 
thus innovation is quite out of place.
As we have seen, Soetomo*s conception of a gamelan society thus 
requires that an individual should blend harmoniously with the commun­
ity . At the same time, a particular rhythm is imposed upon the com­
munity, and each individual should tacitly  agree to "p lay " according 
to this rhythm. Strict conventions are thus imposed upon the in d iv i­
dual by his membership in the group, but w ithin them each member may 
develop his particular skill--skill here meaning not so much how well 
he is able to "p l a y ,"  but how well he is able to play in coordination 
with the group.
How such tacit group cooperation may be solicited  from the com­
munity was elaborated by Soetomo in his art ic le , "Kompetisi ora Kong- 
koerensi" ("Com petition not R i v a l r y " ) .16 There he wrote, "As in the 
playing of the gamelan, people not only must know how to play and be 
expert at it , but they must also obey the r u le s ."  In this way, Soetomo 
argued, "they can work together, not jealous or concerned with showing 
off personal c o n tr ib u t io n s ."17 He then suggested that p olitical par­
ties and associations should work together as though they were playing 
a game like s o c c e r .18 They should compete in a sporting spirit so that 
the best team would win, not sabotaging each other or subverting each 
other’ s e ffo rts . Soetomo recommended that p o litica l  parties compete 
by concentrating their efforts on serving the people, and be judged by 
how well they accomplished this task rather than by the polemical 
propagandizing of their id e o lo g ie s .19
The Relation of Panuntun (Guide) and Pamimpin (Leader) to 
the Rakyat Krama (Common People) who must Manut (ObeyJ
As pointed out above, the gamelan is not leaderless. It has its 
pamurba (supervisors) and its pamangku (sup p orters). How then was such 
a framework to be translated into the reality  of Soetomo*s society, and 
whom did he see as suitable for these roles? Let us begin by examining 
his language. He used panuntun (guide) and pamimpin (leader) to de­
scribe the stratum of "enlightened" (socially  and p o litica lly  conscious) 
members of the society, and rakyat krama to describe the common people. 
In "Tata-tata Samekta ing D joerit" ("Rules and Regulations in Preparing 
for C o m b a t"),20 Soetomo admitted that in his time it could not be ex­
15Judith Becker, "Traditional Music in Modern Java" (Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Michigan, 1972), p. 66. (To be published by the University of Hawaii Press in 
late 1977.)
16"Kompetisi ora Kongkoerensi," in Soetomo, Poespa Rinontje, pp. 41-44.
17Ibid., p. 41. 18Ibid., p. 43. 19Ibid., pp. 43-44.
20Soetomo, "Tata-tata Samekta ing Djoerit," in Poespa Rinontje3 pp. 23-25.
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pected that a leader who could alleviate  their suffering  would emerge 
from the class of common people. The common people s t ill  needed to be 
"gu ided” (dituntun ) and "a id e d ” {ditulung) . At a later date, when 
their living  conditions had improved, they would be ready to take up 
their true pegaw^yan, the performance of which was necessary to achieve 
national independence. Then, Soetomo assured his readers, a leader 
would certainly  be found among the common p e o p le .21
This did not mean that Soetomo!s attitude towards his own people 
was condescending. He simply believed that the rakyat krama were st ill  
unenlightened about their duty to their community and nation, and 
therefore the duty of leadership fe ll  on the more enlightened members 
of society ( i . e . ,  the p r iy a y i ) . Hoping to raise the social conscious­
ness of even his educated readers, Soetomo wrote the following regard­
ing the condition of the rakyat krama:
The unenlightened people (Wong bodo) , who are lazy as well as sloppy 
(sembrana) , who are afraid and timid, who are unenthusiastic towards 
any kind of work, people like that are to be corrected until they 
become knowledgeable, enthusiastic, and diligent in their work.
We must be patient in giving [them] guidance (tuntunan) and examples 
(tetuladari); we must be attentive in giving them "enlightenment"
(sesuluh) 22 which is simple, yet the usefulness of which they can 
sense, so that their confidence in themselves can grow.
When these individuals have become conscious of their duty in pre­
serving their lives, they will then become courageous in their search 
for the means to make their living conditions better. In this con­
text, we will certainly have a group of people who will know their 
own will (tekad). Then we shall have people who can appreciate the 
strong energy of our movement.23
Thus there were to be two stages of development towards the soci­
ety envisaged by Soetomo. The majority of the people were s t ill  unen­
lightened about their duties and tasks and therefore needed guidance to 
achieve Indonesia Mulia. But, once enlightened, these people would 
readily  carry out their resp onsib ilities . They would become pamangku 
in the gamelan society. It was therefore natural that already-enlight­
ened members of the society should act as leaders in the meantime.
This stage would ensure a cohesive body of pamangku, who in turn would 
ensure that community development under the leadership of the pamurba 
could be re a lize d . Eventually, Indonesia Mulia would become a reality . 
Soetomo commented as follows: f,Thus when the intellectual group ad­
heres to its status, it is very fitting  and appropriate for them to be 
w illing  to become leaders (pamimpin) or guides (panuntun) to enable the 
rest of the community to do their tasks without fearing the danger of 
death. When conditions are like that, then those among the common 
people who are prepared and ready w ill go forward together to help us 
achieve our goal; once that step is taken, no one can prevent us [from 
realizing  our g o a l ] .” 24
21Ibid., p. 24.
22Sesuluh literally means to give light, to enlighten, to elucidate, thus to 
explain (menerangkan in Indonesian).
23Ibid., pp. 24-25. 24Ibid., p. 25.
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Soetomo*s Plan for Organizing the Laboring Class
An important step in achieving the gamelan society was organizing 
the workforce to become enlightened pamangku and follow their proper 
leaders. Soetomo's advice to his ’’guides” on the topic of leadership 
is relevant here. His views are contained in three of his main works 
on trade unions: Penjoeloeh Bagi Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia  (A Torch for
the Indonesian Laboring Community), published in 1929; his speech 
’’Pelita  Boeroe” ("A  Lamp for the Workers’1) , read to the Union of Native 
Workers of the Department of Customs in 1932; and Soeloeh Sarekat 
Sekerdja  (4 Torch for the Trade Unions), published in 1 9 3 4 .25 The main 
purpose of these writings was to illuminate ways in which the workers 
could be led to form trade unions and run them e ffectively . For this 
purpose he drew heavily on his own observations and past Indonesian 
experience. But, as his references to the works of Sydney and Beatrice 
Webb, to the economic policies of Ramsay MacDonald (British  Prime Min­
ister during the Depressio n ), and to the recommendations made by Tillema 
(then Dutch Minister for the Colonies) show, he was well aware of the 
history of trade union practices in Western countries.
Two striking features emerge from these w ritings: the absence of 
any exp licit  ideological perspective, and a continuing insistence on 
grassroots participation  as the basis of unionism. He was strongly 
against trade unions having any direct a ff il ia t io n  with religious or 
p o litica l g roups .26 Trade unions should simply have a broad national­
ist and secular character, and reject the models provided by the PFB 
(Personeel Fabrieksbond, Union of [Sugar] Factory Personnel) led by 
Soerjopranoto of the Sarekat Islam, or the VSTP (Vereeniging van Spoor- 
en Tramweg Personeel, Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel), which was 
led by Semaoen and heavily under the influence of the Communist P a r ty .27 
Soetomo reminded his readers that the PFB survived for only a short 
time, because its dominant leader, Soerjopranoto, was persecuted by the 
colonial government.28 The VSTP also dwindled to almost nothing once 
Semaoen was expelled from the country .29 * In these cases, Soetomo
25R. Soetomo, Penjoeloeh Bagi Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia (Surabaya[?]: n .p ., 1929); 
and Soeloeh Sarekat Sekerdja (Surabaya: Ketoea Poesat Pedoman P .B .I ., 1934). The 
text of ’’Pelita Boeroeh” is contained in Soeloeh, pp. 24-50.
26Soetomo, Soeloeh, pp. 5-6, 13; ’’Pelita Boeroeh,” in ibid., pp. 35, 42-45; 
Penjoeloeh, pp. 17-19.
27For more on the VSTP and Semaoen’s role in the nationalist movement, see Van 
Niel, The Emergence, pp. 112-14, 210-11; and Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian 
Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), Chs. 3, 7, 9.
28Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, pp. 21-22. For more on Soerjopranoto and PFB activities 
in 1919-21, see McVey, The Rise> pp. 90-93. McVey notes that most Indonesian workers, 
especially nonskilled workers, tended to regard unions merely as bodies for organizing 
strikes, and they lost interest once these strikes were over. They were thus very 
vulnerable to poststrike retaliation by employers (McVey, The Rise3 p. 90). During 
the height of Soerjopranoto*s popularity as a union leader, the PFB had 31,000 mem­
bers. By 1922, the membership had dwindled to 400 (ibid., p. 390 n. 55).
29Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, pp. 21-22. The VSTP’s membership of 16,975 in October
1921 dwindled to 7,731 during Semaoen*s absence in Russia from October 1921 to May
1922 (McVey, The Rise, pp. 125-37). After an unsuccessful strike in May 1923, Semaoen 
was expelled from Indonesia, and many radical union leaders were arrested, injuring 
the union as well as the leadership of the Communist Party (ibid., p. 152).
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argued, the p o litica l parties represented by Soerjopranoto and Semaoen 
could do nothing to protect the interests of the union members; indeed, 
p o litica l party a ff il ia t io n  had proved to be a l ia b il it y .
Trade unions, he believed , had to try to survive regardless of a 
country’ s current p olitica l clim ate, and this task was especially  d i f ­
ficu lt  in a colonial situation , where the government could arbitrarily  
purge a un ion ’ s leaders. Survival, he believed , depended on having a 
sound financial base as well as a large number of competent leaders. 
Union leadership should never be dependent on the creativity  or ingenu­
ity of one particular in d iv id u a l .30 Teamwork was essential, like the 
teamwork in a gamelan orchestra, where no player stands out above the 
others. Teamwork was most likely  to be strong where all members of a 
union shared a single purpose--the improvement of its immediate member­
s h ip ’ s lives . Since not all members of a p o litica l  party or a r e l i ­
gious association would belong to the labor force or even be members 
of the laboring c l a s s ,31 their interests and goals would necessarily 
d iffe r  from those of the laboring men in a ffilia te d  unions. In unaf­
filia te d  unions, however, the workers could be united as workers.
Their unity would be based on their shared sk ills  and the type of ser­
vice they performed, not subject to ideological or religious d iv i ­
sions . 32
It is interesting that Soetomo also warned unions against organiz­
ing along ethnic lines . He pointed out the ease with which the colo­
nial government divided the native workers by giving them d ifferentia l  
wages, social security , retirement benefits , and the lik e , according 
to ethnic group. For example, the Ambonese and Menadonese workers re ­
ceived wages and privileges closest to those of their Eurasian super­
visors , while the Javanese workers received the lowest wages permis­
sible by la w .33 Employers were always unified  by their economic 
interests and never allowed their varied ethnicity  to undermine that 
unity . Workers should follow their example. Soetomo cited the Sugar 
Syndicate to make his point. Not only was it domestically united in 
protecting its interests against the workers and against government 
regulation . On the global level, too, the World Sugar Syndicate coop­
erated to drive down the price paid to the small producer as far as 
p o ss ib le . 3**
It might be thought that by these warnings Soetomo was clearly 
recognizing that class conflict was more fundamental than all others. 
Yet this surmise would not be quite correct. For though Soetomo saw 
the deep conflict of interest between labor and management, he did not 
deduce from this a radical struggle along class lines . Rather, he pro­
posed that the laboring community work to manage its own financial 
a ffa ir s , and begin by dealing only with native banks. He warned that 
most of the European banks in Indonesia- - e.g ., Escompto, the Colonial 
Bank, and the trading banks-- invested in and financed most of the sugar 
factories and plantations. The boards of directors of these banks 
usually also controlled the management of the plantations and factories 
in which the native workers were employed. It would obviously thus be
3°Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, pp. 21-22. 31Soetomo, Soeloeh> pp. 5-6, 8, 13.
32Ibid. 33Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, pp. 77-78.
3**Soetomo, f,Pelita Boeroeh," in Soeloeh> pp. 45-46.
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foolish  for the workers and the unions to bank with these European in ­
stitutions . The banks1 primary commitments were to the managements of 
these enterprises; the banks would inform them of the exact financial 
resources of the workers, a situation  which would render the workers 
vulnerable during wage negotiations and strikes . Soetomo therefore 
advised the unions to deal only with native national banks, which were 
not linked to colonial business interests . This would also prevent the 
European banks1 managers from investing the native workers1 savings to 
improve European-owned firms and fa c t o r ie s .35 Better s t i l l ,  unions 
should establish  their own banks, which could, in addition , provide job 
opportunities for native workers by reinvesting their money in small 
factories manufacturing goods especially  useful to the laboring commun­
ity ( e .g . ,  shoes, clothes, or cheap processed food and so f o r t h ) .36 
Aside from representing only the interests of workers, such banks would 
also ensure that the workers learned to manage their own financial a f ­
fairs and help them gain insight regarding national economic and p o l it ­
ical m atters .37 Soetomo was certainly not advocating support for native 
banks in order to replace a class of European entrepreneurs with native 
ones. Nor did he want native to exploit native . It was rather that 
the laboring class had to acquire the sk ills  and power of the manage­
rial and entrepreneurial c lass , controlling their own financial re ­
sources .
Here lay the fundamental difference between trade unions as en­
visioned by Soetomo and those run by the Sarekat Islam and the Commu­
nist Party: Soetomo viewed trade unionism as a defensive economic 
weapon, useful mainly to ensure the economic survival of the workers, 
and therefore of Indonesians as a whole. The Sarekat Islam and the 
communists used trade unions for p olitica l e n d s .38
It is perhaps sign ificant that Soetomo did most of his writing on 
trade unions during the period 1929-34, a time when Indonesians experi­
enced massive p o litica l repression and most of the radical nationalist 
leaders were muzzled or exiled . The options available to Soetomo were 
very lim ited; unless he chose to incur the wrath of the government, his 
position could be none other than a moderate one, socially  rather than 
p o litica lly  oriented. Yet a "s o c ia l "  approach fitted  closely with 
Soetomo’ s deep private prejudices against p o litica l  action and p o l it i ­
cal p arties . Even when he finally  overcame these prejudices in 1930, 
and made a pragmatic decision to form a party him self, the Partai 
Bangsa In d o n e s ia ,39 he made sure that the aims of the party were 
oriented toward cultural, social, and economic improvement within the 
existing system rather than toward dramatic p o litica l change.
35Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, pp. 65-66. 36Ibid., p. 67.
37Ibid., pp. 68-69. To support his point, Soetomo cited examples from Belgium,
Germany, and the Scandinavian countries, where workers were able to operate banking 
enterprises successfully.
38The majority of the strikes initiated by the SI and the Communist Party were 
organized for political reasons, without consideration of the social and economic 
consequences of failure. (Almost all ended in serious reverses.)
39Soetomo had wanted Budi Utomo to remain a cultural, rather than a political 
association, as proposed by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat (K. H. 
Dewantara). See Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," pp. 37-55, 201-7. The transfor­
mation of his Studieclub into a political party came about only because Soetomo felt 
there was a political vacuum after most of the more radical leaders had been arrested.
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His negative attitude towards p olitical parties did not necessar­
ily  mean that Soetomo entirely  ruled out the p o ssib ility  that union 
members might benefit from working with certain p o litica l parties . But 
the cooperation he envisaged was to be on a case-by-case basis and d i ­
rected towards supporting particular politicians  in legislative  bodies. 
Many of the skilled  workers' unions established under Soetomo's guid­
ance thus supported Parindra. These unions included the VIPBOW (Ve- 
reeniging van Inlandsch Personeel Burgerlijke Openbare Werken, Union 
of Public Works Em ployees),40 the PPPB (Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian 
Bumiputra, the Native Pawnshop Workers' A s s o c ia t io n ),41 the PSI (Persa- 
tuan Supir Indonesia, the Native Motor Vehicle Drivers* A sso c ia tio n ), 42 
and the PGHB (Perserikatan Guru-guru Hindia Belanda, the Netherlands 
Indies Teachers* U n io n ) .43 All had been long-time supporters of Budi 
Utomo and the PBI.
But tactical support for particular p oliticians  or parties was 
in su ffic ie n t , Soetomo believed , to achieve the unions* legislative  
aims. He therefore strongly recommended that trade unions maintain 
open communication with various sectors of the government to keep fully  
acquainted with the complexities of current regulations concerning 
workers. The unions could then formulate achievable reform policies  
and make plans for implementing them. Such reforms might include regu­
lation of working hours, improvement of safety conditions, sick leave, 
l ife  insurance, and the l i k e .44
Such protection of laborers was totally lacking in Indonesia, 
though in Holland itse lf  an in it ia l  industrial safety act had been 
passed as early as 1895, a workers’ compensation act in 1901, and a 
health and national insurance act in 1 9 1 9 .45 Soetomo felt  that the 
most basic needs of the workers must be taken care of before they could 
consider joining  the p olitica l debates over class co n flict , anticolo­
nialism , and the struggle for an independent Indonesia. He was also 
deeply aware that the vast majority even of Indonesian workers, let 
alone peasants, were s t ill  i l l it e r a t e , and that this made the problem 
of organizing them into effective  unions all the more d if f ic u lt .
Two hundred years of exploitive colonial rule meant, he believed , 
that the present struggle of the native laboring force against the 
European capitalists  was like a battle between "a  cucumber and a 
d u r ia n .’*46 European capitalists  in the Indies , with the powerful back­
ing of colonial law, were assured of a large supply of cheap, illite ra te
4°For a brief account of the role of the VIPBOW (established in 1917) in the 
nationalist movement, see Van Niel, The Emergence, pp. 122-24.
41For a brief account of the role of the PPPB (established in 1916), see ibid., 
pp. 123, 147, 199-200. Cf. A. Nagazumi, ffThe Pawnshop Strikes of 1922 and the Indo­
nesian Political Parties,t! Archipel, 8 (1974), pp. 187-206.
42For the constitution and work program of the Persatuan Supir Indonesia, see 
Soetomo, Penjoeloeh, Appendices. This was the closest Soetomo came to trying to 
organize the urban proletariat--but note the specific occupational skills required.
43For a brief account of the PGHB (established in 1912), see Van Niel, The 
Emergence, pp. 123, 155.
44Soetomo, So elo eh pp. 14-15. 45Ibid., p. 19.
46Soetomo, "Pelita Boeroeh,** in ibid., p. 31.
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labor. Plantation laborers worked under government-approved con­
tracts, for p it ifu l  wages, and under miserable working conditions. 
Outside efforts to organize the workers were largely fu t ile , since 
plantation managers permitted few persons aside from employees to live 
inside the plantation complex.**7 Even organizing skilled  workers was 
an uphill b attle , since government controls on the freedom to strike , 
freedom of the press, freedom of political expression, and freedom to 
hold workers1 meetings and conferences, were all designed precisely  to 
curb any growth in the native labor movement.**8 In such circumstances, 
Soetomo argued, the Indonesian labor force had to have a dual purpose, 
on the one hand fighting against the evil social effects of capitalist  
power, and on the other fighting nationwide for an independent Indone­
sia .**9 And both aims would have to be pursued in a style suited to 
Indonesian conditions, not one imitated from European m odels.50
Conclusion
The main image of the society to which Soetomo aspired was not a 
society divided between leaders and the mass of the population, but 
rather a united , harmonious community. It may be that Soetomo thereby 
projected onto the Indonesian nationalist movement a priyayi taste for 
order and social deference; nonetheless, he did make concrete proposals 
for social change. In this regard his thinking on the fflabor movement11 
in Indonesia was typical and important. His approach to trade union­
ism, although substantially  derived from his views on Javanese society 
as a whole, was far from ideological or romantic. It was, in fact , as 
pragmatic as the strategies of many trade union leaders in Western in ­
dustrialized  countries. (In  particular , his approach brings to mind 
that of Samuel Gompers, f irst  head of the American Federation of Labor, 
who propagated Mjob conscious” business unionism .51) Unlike many edu­
cated idealists  from privileged  classes, Soetomo did not try to foist 
a romantic role on the laboring c l a s s .52 His personal experiences may 
well have contributed to his realism ; for his own success in the modern 
world was achieved by intensely practical m eans.53 Above a l l , he
**7Ibid., p. 35. **8Ibid. **9Ibid. 50Ibid., pp. 35-36.
51I am grateful to Peter Scherer for pointing out Samuel Gompers*s concept of 
trade unionism to me. The main theoretical exposition of Gompers*s thought is in 
Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Macmillan, 1928). The prac­
tice of exclusive craft unionism in Britain, though for the most part not intellec­
tually rationalized, also bears some resemblances to Soetomo*s approach to unionism. 
See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London: Longmans, 1897).
52Sukarno*s concept of f,MarhaenismM is an example of such romanticism. ("Mar- 
haen" more or less means "the little people.") See Sukarno*s speech to the thirtieth 
anniversary meeting of the PNI, Bandung, 1957, translated as Marhaen and Proletarian3 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series No. 24 (Ithaca, 1960). Lenin*s 
view of the working class is yet another example. He rejected an "economist" role 
for trade unions and insisted that the only role of working class organizations was 
to bring about revolution. See Lenin, What Is To Be Done? (Moscow: Progress Pub­
lisher, 1952).
53High social status did not necessarily ensure economic security. The income 
of the impoverished lesser nobility of Jogjakarta and Surakarta was often lower than 
that of the newly arrived priyayi. Priyayi employed in the native section of the 
colonial administration were largely dependent on government salaries for their live­
lihood, while "professional priyayi," receiving their income from professional fees, 
could often make very handsome livings.
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wanted the working class to be as independent and as economically se­
cure as he was him self. He believed that the way to achieve this goal, 
given the conditions of colonial exploitation , was to develop "job  
conscious unionism ." Stressing , as he d id , "job  security " over "c lass  
s o l id a r it y ,"  Soetomo tended to downplay the future p o ssib ility  of class 
conflict between priyayi and the bulk of the work force. While advo­
cating that the priyayi share their economic and social privileges with 
the rest of society , at no time did he talk much about sharing p o l i t i ­
cal power. This omission, of course, may have been caused by the de­
pressing p o litica l  realities  of his t im e .34 But it would probably be 
truer to attribute it to his conception of a gamelan society. The 
gamelan image was, in his eyes, both culturally  appropriate and sensi­
bly pragmatic in its political im plications. For while there are 
subtle d ifferentiatio ns  of status within a gamelan orchestra between 
those who are supporters (pamangku) and those who are in charge (pa- 
m urba), these differences are actually what make possible the produc­
tion of beautiful sounds.
54See his text "Tata-tata Samekta ing Djoerit," quoted above.
